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are remarkably similar to the corresponding estimates for the United States. The results 
reinforce the view that tax changes do indeed have powerful, persistent and significant effects 
on the economy. Finally, ‘exogenous’ tax changes are shown to have contributed to major 
episodes in the U.K. business cycle. 
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Despite its importance for current macroeconomic policymaking, evidence of the macroeconomic
eects of tax changes in the United Kingdom is sparse. Furthermore, there remains a distinct lack
of consensus in the international evidence. Do tax cuts stimulate the economy? Will tax increases
harm economic recovery? Answering these questions remains a contentious issue and one that is
particularly pertinent at a time of intense disagreement about the macroeconomic consequences of
a scal consolidation.
This paper helps ll the evidence gap, making three important contributions. First, I provide
new, robust estimates for the macroeconomic eects of tax changes in the United Kingdom by
constructing a new narrative dataset. I nd that a 1 percentage point cut in taxes as a proportion
of GDP causes a 0.6 per cent stimulus to GDP on impact, rising to 2.5 per cent increase over
nearly three years. Second, this paper makes a direct contribution to the international evidence;
my results are remarkably similar to the Romer and Romer (2010) narrative-based estimates for the
United States. Third, this work (and the narrative paper itself, Cloyne (2010)) provides detailed
new data for analysing the eects of U.K. tax policy and its history.
Microeconometric work has already used historical tax reforms in the U.K. for estimating
changes in behaviour. For example, Blundell et al. (1998) use the 1980s tax reforms to estimate
labour supply elasticities. Cummins et al. (1996) use the 1991 corporation tax cuts to examine the
responsiveness of business investment using rm level data.1
However, few studies have examined the macroeconomic eects of tax changes in the United
Kingdom. This gap is reected in the U.K. Oce for Budget Responsibility's report from June
2010. The tax multipliers used by the OBR are derived, in part, from an IMF survey paper from
2009. Of the nineteen studies reviewed by the IMF only two specically examine the U.K. The
OBR's other multiplier assumptions come from common large-scale macro-econometric forecasting
models which often crucially depend on modelling assumptions.2
The academic literature has focused on the United States and cross country panel datasets.
However, even for the U.S. there is no consensus. This reects the diculty of identifying tax
policy shocks uncorrelated with, and uncontaminated by, other uctuations. The basic problem is
one of simultaneity. Changes in taxes are likely to contemporaneously aect GDP but commonly
used tax variables such as tax revenues are also contemporaneously driven by GDP.
1Other examples are Blow and Preston (2002) who use the post-1979 tax reform period to estimate the extent of
responsiveness in taxable earned income to rates of taxation and various papers which study the employment eect of
the introduction of the Working Families' Tax Credit, such as Gregg and Harkness (2003) and Blundell et al. (2005)
2Indeed, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) argue \the evidence from large-scale econometric models has been largely
dismissed on the grounds that, because of their Keynesian structure, these models assume rather than document a
positive eect of scal expansions on output".
2The recent literature has tackled the resulting identication problem in two ways. The rst
approach, initiated by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), seeks to identify the shocks to revenues that
are contemporaneously uncorrelated with other uctuations, from a structural vector autoregression
(SVAR).3 This is achieved by assuming that policymakers do not respond to shocks within the
quarter. External information on the elasticity of revenue to output is then used to create cyclically
adjusted revenues. For the U.S., the eect of a tax shock on GDP is typically around 1 per cent.4
However, results vary across countries. For example, one of the few studies to consider the U.K.,
Perotti (2005), reports small negative eects of a tax cut on GDP.
The second method uses the narrative record to construct a direct measure of the policy shocks
that are uncorrelated with current or projected economic uctuations. So-called narrative ap-
proaches have been used to identify government spending shocks ((Ramey and Shapiro (1998);
Ramey (2008)), monetary policy shocks (Romer and Romer (1989, 2004)) and, most relevantly,
tax shocks in the U.S. by Romer and Romer (2010). Romer and Romer nd a large and persistent
eect of tax changes on GDP, reaching nearly 3 per cent over three years.
Identication in the SVAR approach crucially depends on the assumptions. Furthermore, the
results can be quite sensitive to the elasticity used. This issue is a particular problem for the U.K.
results in Perotti (2005). The narrative method oers a more direct approach and, in evaluating
the state of current knowledge, Beetsma (2008) argues \the contribution that likely yields the most
reliable results up to now is Romer and Romer".
However, the existing literature presents at least two puzzles. First, do the eect of tax changes
vary across countries | in particular does a tax cut in the U.K. really lead to a decline in GDP?
Second, is the eect as large in the U.S. as estimated by Romer and Romer? Without further
narrative studies this is very dicult to establish.
This paper provides new estimates for the U.K. by pursuing a narrative-based approach. How-
ever, in doing so, I directly contribute to the international evidence. A number of factors make the
U.K. an ideal country for a new study. Firstly, the U.K. has a long history of using tax policy and
there were many policy changes. Secondly, the U.K. Budget process is ideal for the construction
of a new narrative dataset. Tax policy is highly centralised5 and since the Budget is a major an-
nual event, tax changes are largely saved for this announcement with implementation taking place
throughout the year. Furthermore, unlike in the United States, these announcements almost always
become law. In addition, detailed revenue forecasts are provided for all the Budget measures and
there is extensive political debate and discussion about the motivation for each change.
3See, for example, Perotti (2005, 2007), for a survey.
4Blanchard and Perotti (2002) conclude that the eects for the U.S. are small, often close to 1. Perotti (2005)
nds a maximum eect on GDP for the U.S. of around 0.6 per cent.
5Adam et al. (2010) note that only 5 per cent of revenue is raised locally.
3I therefore construct, from scratch, a new narrative dataset for the U.K. The detail can be found
in a companion paper Cloyne (2010).6 Having assembled data from ocial Budget sources on all the
discretionary policy changes between 1945{2009, I employ the Romer{Romer (RR) identication
strategy. I use the justications given in the narrative record to isolate tax policy changes which
were not responding to, or inuenced by, current or projected economic uctuations. I follow RR
in calling these `exogenous' tax policy changes (as opposed to `endogenous').
In categorising each of the 2,500 discretionary policy changes I keep as close as possible to the
stated motivation. This generates slightly dierent subcategories from those in RR. The `exogenous'
category contains actions to improve long-run economic performance, ideological changes related
to party political or social causes, rulings from external bodies such as courts, and scal consoli-
dation measures based on long-run considerations. The endogenous changes are actions to manage
demand, to stimulate production, to oset a debt crisis and those to fund spending decisions.
Having constructed an `exogenous' tax series, I then use it to consistently estimate the macro-
economic eects of tax shocks in the United Kingdom. Given the construction of the series, a
relatively simple regression should, in principle, achieve this.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the identication strategy and my new
U.K. quarterly dataset, its construction and properties. I also show that the constructed series is
unforecastable on the basis of past macroeconomic data. The companion paper, Cloyne (2010),
contains more details and the narrative itself. Section 3 presents the baseline results using the
new tax shocks. Section 4 runs a variety of robustness checks. Section 5 shows that both long-
run economic and ideologically motivated tax cuts have similar stimulus eects. Finally, section 6
examines the contribution of the tax shocks to the U.K. business cycle. I show they contributed to
several major episodes in the post-war period. Section 7 concludes that the macroeconomic eects
of tax shocks are powerful, persistent and signicant in the U.K.
2 The new U.K. post-war tax dataset
2.1 Identication
One of the key problems in identifying the macroeconomic eects of tax changes is simultaneity.
Discretionary changes in taxes are likely to aect GDP contemporaneously, but aggregate uc-
tuations will also contemporaneously aect commonly used tax measures (such as tax revenues).
Suppose output growth, yt (where yt is the log of real GDP), is related to changes in taxes as
follows:
yt = 0 +  t + ut (1)
6Available at: http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/uctpjsc/
4where 0 is a constant and t is a chosen measure of tax changes. Any measure t which is a
function of factors also contemporaneously aecting output, cannot be used to consistently identify
the eects of tax changes. If t = (ut) then the chosen tax measure would be contemporaneously
correlated with the error term, violating the standard requirement for consistent estimation of the
coecients.
As a specic example, and to illustrate the popular Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identication
approach, consider the following simple model. Suppose taxes are measured by (log of real) tax
revenues, st. Also assume that the change in tax revenues is aected by movements in aggregate
output and another shock, t:
yt = 0 +  st + ut (2)
st = yt + t (3)
where  is taken to be the elasticity of output with respect to revenues.
The Blanchard and Perotti (2002) approach seeks to identify t as the `structural' shocks to
revenues: those uncorrelated with other contemporaneous economic shocks. The method assumes
policymakers are not informed about, or are unable to respond to, shocks within the same quarter.
The method then uses external information to calibrate the elasticity . A series for  can then
be constructed. Under these assumptions the  series is interpreted as the discretionary policy
decisions uncorrelated with other uctuations.
There are at least three problems with this method. First, if the timing assumptions do not
hold, then  does not simply reect the automatic response of revenues to output.  would also
be capturing any legislated changes in policy which are contemporaneously correlated with output.
Second, we need to be condent that the specication (3) adequately captures the cyclical inuences
on revenues. Of course, we could add extra variables such as ination or the interest rate to the right
hand side but, as many factors are likely to aect revenues, it is unclear what a comprehensive list
would be. Errors in the specication would lead to  incorrectly capturing the structural, policy-
induced, shocks to revenues. Third, legislated tax shocks are not simply shocks to revenues; they
alter rates and liabilities, which themselves are likely to aect the elasticity .
Ideally we would like a direct measure of the policy innovations uncorrelated with other current
or prospective shocks. Suppose we could construct such a series and that its past and present
values were uncorrelated with other contemporaneous shocks. This is sometimes referred to as
weak exogeneity or simply exogeneity.7 Under this condition,8 with an innite sample and by
appealing to the Wold decomposition theorem, we can estimate a simple innite distributed lag
model
7In contrast to strict exogeneity which requires that the whole tax series t = 0;:::;T is uncorrelated with ut.
8And the other standard conditions ensuring the consistency of OLS.
5yt =  +
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and consistently estimate the dynamic eects of the tax shock on output (the  coecients). dt
is the constructed `exogenous' tax series. Note that the key identifying assumption is E(t j
dt;dt 1;:::) = 0.
In this paper I adopt a narrative approach to identify such a series and, following Romer{Romer
(RR), I call these `exogenous' discretionary tax changes. Data on all discretionary policy decisions
are collected from narrative sources (such as U.K. Budget documents). I then employ the RR
strategy of classifying tax changes by motivation. This allows me to identify those decisions that
were taken for reasons uncorrelated with current or prospective economic conditions. Actions which
do not satisfy this criteria are referred to as `endogenous'.
To make the discussion more concrete assume the discretionary policy decisions are observable
from narrative sources and call these pt. pt is likely to be made up of an exogenous component
xt (in the sense discussed above) and policy changes that react to economic uctuations | for
example output, ination, unemployment, scal decits and so on, f(yt;t;ut;bt). Hence pt =
xt + f(yt;t;ut;bt). Simply using pt as a measure of dt will lead to inconsistent estimates of the 
coecients in equation (4) as f() is correlated with . However, assuming that we can construct
an exogenous series from the narrative record, xt (and its lags) should be uncorrelated with the
error terms, allowing for consistent estimation of the eects of tax policy shocks.
It can also be seen from equation (4) that several common tax measures cannot be used in place
of dt. Using total revenues violates E(t j dt;dt 1;:::) = 0 as current shocks to output also aect
revenues (equation (3)). The same is likely to be true of tax rates and the full discretionary policy
change series pt. As policy variables sometimes respond contemporaneously to other economic
shocks, these are also correlated with t. The narrative approach is so useful precisely because it
isolates the policy changes for which the identifying assumptions hold.
2.2 Constructing the exogenous series
2.2.1 Data Sources
The centrepiece of the British tax process is the annual Budget. This is a traditional and grand
occasion which attracts extraordinary media coverage in spite of its technical nature. Part of the
attraction is the rhetoric and theatre of the Budget speech as well as the anticipation of surprises
Chancellors invariably try to pull out of their hat. However, the Budget is more than pomp and
circumstance; it is also the annual presentation of the Government's economic policy. The policy
changes are | with the exception of emergency measures and recently a second Budget-type event
6in the autumn (the Pre-Budget Report) | stored up for this performance. This process and the
other features mentioned in the introduction make the U.K. ideal for a narrative study of tax
changes.
To construct an `exogenous' series, the starting point is to identify and collect revenue forecasts
for all the discretionary policy changes. The source for the revenue estimates is the Financial
Statement and Budget Report9 (FSBR), commonly known as the Red Book, which is published
alongside the Budget speech. For actions between Budgets (not already covered in the FSBR) I
use estimates given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to Parliament. The source for this is the
ocial parliamentary record, Hansard.
Other sources are used to ensure that I have accounted for all the interim tax changes. Firstly,
the Chancellor's Budget speech often mentions measures already taken. But secondly, I use the eco-
nomic history literature; several major contributions contain chronologies which were of signicant
help.10 Together all these sources identify nearly 2,500 non-negligible11 tax changes.
Changes in Social Security contributions (National Insurance) are considered when they are part
of the Budget process. In the earlier part of the sample, changes to National Insurance contributions
were announced separately and closely followed changes in welfare transfers; this reected the
original `Contributory Principle' behind National Insurance. I am therefore condent that these
extra-Budgetary changes were spending-driven and therefore not `exogenous' (see discussion below).
In later years National Insurance became more like a tax (both in structure and use) and was
brought into the Budget process. When included in the Budget process I make use of these changes.
This is discussed in more detail in Cloyne (2010).
The next step is to split the series by motivation. For each change I primarily use the Chancel-
lor's Budget speech and, since 1997, the Economic and Fiscal Strategy Report (EFSR) (which was
specically designed to explain and justify actions). Other documents also proved useful: the FSBR
itself, the Economic Surveys in the early years, relevant White Papers (statements of government
policy), technical notes and additional debates and speeches recorded in Hansard. The history
literature was important in framing the context and highlighting additional events of relevance.
However, as in RR, the policymakers' explanation is generally taken at face value. The intention is
not to provide an exhaustive review of dierent commentators' perspectives but rather to provide a
narrative of the stated justications for action (and a sense of how policymakers saw their actions
at the time).
9Before 1969 this was simply called the Financial Statement and in the early years a separate Economic Survey
was published.
10Useful texts included Dow (1964), Cairncross (1992), Britton (1991) and Woodward (2004).
11The denition of a negligible action is made by Her Majesty's Treasury (HM Treasury) and no public gure is
then given for these policy changes. In 2009 for example, this was a change amounting to less than 0.0002 per cent
of GDP.
7Implementation dates are usually given in the FSBR or the speech. For changes where this is
not the case I also make use of the Finance Act itself (the legislation enacting the Budget measures)
or relevant Statutory Instruments (secondary legislation) and technical notes. More detail on the
legislative arrangements in the U.K. are described in Cloyne (2010).
2.2.2 Classifying the motivation
Following RR, I distinguish between endogenous and exogenous tax policy changes. Recall that an
`exogenous' policy decision is one that was taken for reasons uncorrelated with current or prospective
economic conditions. This is the most important distinction given that the objective is precisely
to isolate these changes.
As mentioned, I have attempted to keep as close as possible to the spirit of the motivation. I split
endogenous changes broadly into four categories: those to regulate demand (demand management),
those to boost production (supply stimuli), those to deal with a decit crisis (decit reduction) and
those that nanced spending decisions.
A demand management change attempts to adjust aggregate demand (or specic components)
following contemporaneous or projected uctuations in the economy. There are many examples
from 1945 to 1979.12 A classic example is a stimulus to aggregate demand to oset a negative
shock to output. However, there are many cases where the policymaker was responding to curb
ination or rectify a balance of payments crisis. The crucial element is whether demand regulation
via a tax change was the key mechanism to oset another shock.
Where a supply-side reform attempts to oset an immediate shock I classify this as a supply
stimulus. A good example is the 1985 cuts to National Insurance contributions. As a consequence
of the early 1980s recession, unemployment had been rising sharply to 1985 and this motivated
policy action. The approach was, however, justied in terms of making it less costly to hire workers
and policymakers specically rejected a stimulus to demand.
I classify a policy as a decit reduction action if it was specically triggered by concern over
current movements in the decit (for example concerns about the government's credit rating) or a
clear consequence of another shock. For example, the Government in 1993 argued the decit was
a direct consequence of the recession and was rising too fast: immediate action was required and
taxes were increased. RR do not have this category but there is clear evidence in the U.K. narrative
of policy contemporaneously responding to decit changes.
Spending-driven changes explicitly nance a spending action. I only assign this category where
there is a clear link between a tax change and a spending decision. A good example of a spending-
12Dow (1964) argues \there is probably no country in the world that has made a fuller use than the United Kingdom
of budgetary policy as a means of stabilising the economy".
8driven change was the 2002 increase in National Insurance contributions to fund expansion of the
National Health Service.
The exogenous actions are split into four categories: measures taken to boost long-run economic
performance, those motivated by ideological or political reasons, those enforced by external bodies
and, less obviously, those to deal with an inherited decit or for future decit consolidation.
Although long-run economic actions are not designed to oset a current shock, these need not
only be taken in times of calm. The 1979 Conservative Government made a number of supply-side
reforms as part of their long-term economic strategy even during a recession. Such measures were
not designed to oset the current recession. In cases where a supply-side action is intended to oset
a shock, supply stimulus would be a more appropriate categorisation.
Ideological changes are those taken for political and philosophical reasons, not explicitly to
inuence economic performance. The Conservative Government's married couples' allowance (and
the 1997 Labour Government's removal of it) is a clear example of this.
External changes are those imposed on policymakers by rulings from external bodies. Examples
of external decisions are court judgements and the enforcement of European directives.
The previous three categories are more obviously exogenous: policy changes do not react to
shocks. Policy actions in the fourth exogenous category, decit consolidation, are likely to reect
past shocks (for example the eect of a previous recession). RR dene a decit-driven policy
change as either dealing with an inherited decit for long-run reasons (for example, a belief that
it will support long-run growth) or a planned future consolidation to oset a current scal action.
However, there are no examples in the U.K. where an incoming government decided to deal with a
decit independent of the current macroeconomic situation. There was always a sense of crisis and
this led me to introduce the new endogenous decit reduction category.
There are, however, some cases where decit consolidations were planned for future years. This
was a way of anchoring credibility while spreading the consolidation over time. For example, the
scal stimulus designed to oset the 2008{09 recession was accompanied by planned tax rises several
years later. In the sense discussed in section 2.1 these are still exogenous, being correlated only
with past shocks. One still might worry that all decit consolidations are in some sense endogenous.
Indeed the RR decit category has attracted some criticism on these grounds. To guard against
this possibility, in section 5 I re-estimate the baseline model excluding the decit consolidation
category; I report that the results are largely unaected.
It is useful to note the similarity with the RR categories. Their `countercyclical' category closely
relates to demand management and supply stimuli. `Spending-driven' is the same category. The
new endogenous category is `decit reduction' as there is sucient evidence of contemporaneous
inuences on decit actions. For the exogenous changes, long-run, ideological and external can be
9matched to RR's `long-run' category and `decit consolidation' is similar although more restrictive.
2.2.3 Specic issues in applying the categorisation
Budgets tended to have an overall motivation as well as providing specic justication for each
measure. In the companion paper, Cloyne (2010), I individually classify all the discretionary policy
changes and provide evidence for the categorisation. I carefully weigh up both the overall and
specic comments to disentangle the primary motivation. In annex C two example Budgets are
shown, taken from the companion paper: 1968 where almost all the measures were to limit demand
and 1985 where the central theme was supply-side reform for long-term economic performance.
There is an important grey area that requires discussion. In a few cases the overall motivation
appears in direct conict with the specic objective for individual measures. Consider a simple
example. In 1968 all but two changes were stated to limit demand (tax increases) but the other
changes are designed to help the elderly (a tax cut) and this is clearly marked as delivering on a
long-run social objective. In one sense the latter is exogenous but, if the Chancellor had a target for
lowering demand in mind, then this cut had to be oset elsewhere. Furthermore, the measures often
have dierent implementation dates and do not oset each other in the aggregate. Two actions
may therefore be correlated if a seemingly exogenous action precipitates a larger endogenous one.
It is usually very unclear the extent to which the Chancellor intended for some measures to oset
others. In these more complicated cases I provide an alternative classication taking the whole
Budget package together. In the 1968 example I classify all measures, including an ideological tax
cut, as demand management. The `alternative' series is then used as a robustness check below,
with the results largely unaected.
Another related but simpler issue is the treatment of packages of measures or actions designed
to oset other actions. For example, between 1979 and 1997 there were considerable alterations
in the balance of taxation from income tax to Value Added Tax (V.A.T.). It was argued that
the V.A.T. rise was funding an income tax cut and the income tax cut was designed to stimulate
long-term growth. Rather than categorise the income tax cut as `long-run' and the V.A.T. rise
as, for example, `decit reduction', it seems wise to categorise the package as `long-run', even if a
V.A.T. rise on its own might harm the economy.
102.2.4 Transforming the narrative into a quarterly dataset
The objective is to construct a quarterly time series from 1945 to 2009.13 The resulting series
will be the change in projected revenue (which most closely reect changes in on-going liabilities)
normalised by GDP and expressed as a percentage. In this sense the resulting series can be seen
as changes in an average tax rate.14
I make use of revenue forecasts from the Budget documents but my focus is on the change in tax
liabilities. In general, measures that simply alter the timing of existing taxes are excluded. Good
examples of this are the introduction of quarterly payments of tax for small employers or where a
reduction in Advance Corporation Tax was to be \balanced by an increase in the subsequent liability
to mainstream corporation tax".15 However, for some taxes, exclusion seems less appropriate. In
the 2000s there were several examples of attempts to raise fuel duty but then, following volatility
in the oil market or protests, this was deferred. In several cases the postponement was explicitly
designed to support consumers' expenditure | a form of stimulus | and it seems prudent to leave
these changes in the series. Cloyne (2010) discusses these cases in more detail.
In keeping with this focus on liabilities I make use of the `full year' revenue estimate. This was
the on-going annualised revenue eect (rather than any temporary revenue eect in the short run
due to the timing of revenues reaching the Exchequer). I assign this gure to the implementation
date, following Romer and Romer. I deal with possible anticipation eects below. In more recent
years, estimates were given for several years ahead rather than as a `full year' gure. However,
the gures for the later years' forecast are usually very similar. It is clear what reects the `full
year' estimate and where gures did not correspond to a `full year' concept this is explained in the
Budget documents. I therefore generally use the latest year of data, although carefully watch for
changes in revenue which do not appear to follow the `full year' concept. Each case is considered
individually in Cloyne (2010).
Having assigned a motivation to a revenue change, I aggregate the tax series based on motivation
and implementation date. This requires assigning the calendar dates to quarters. I follow RR by
assuming that changes implemented in the second half of a calendar quarter have their economic
eect in the next quarter. For example, a change implemented on 25th March is assigned to quarter
two and not quarter one. In terms of announcement dates the appropriate dating method is the
13The nal Budget I consider is April 2009. The December 2009 Pre-Budget Report (PBR) contained measures
to be implemented in the 2010 Finance Bill but, with a General Election scheduled for the rst half of 2010, it was
unclear at the time of analysis which measures would actually become law. I do, however, use macroeconomic data
up to and including 2009Q4; being in December, PBR measures would have been dated in 2010Q1 at the earliest |
see below.
14As in both Romer and Romer (2010) and Mertens and Ravn (2010).
15FSBR 1988, page 47.
11actual quarter of announcement.
The resulting aggregate series represents the forecast `full year' change in revenues in each
quarter, by motive. I follow RR and scale this by the annualised level of nominal GDP in each
quarter. This is appropriate as the revenue gures are also annualised (hence quarterly revenue
divided by quarterly GDP would generate the same ratio). UK GDP is not available quarterly
prior to 1955 and so the consistent part of the sample must begin in 1955Q1. However, annual
GDP is available from 1948 to 1955 and for these years I use the annual nominal GDP gure for
the four quarters within that year.
There are a number of more specic technical issues and assumptions but for brevity I direct
the reader to Cloyne (2010) for the detailed discussion. I simply ag the most important cases
below.
The rst is how to treat temporary changes. For a temporary change the appropriate revenue
estimate is not the `full year' cost but rather the value which most closely reects the total yield
or cost of the action. This is usually clear and I assign this gure to the implementation date,
reversing it on the end date.
Secondly, there are a minority of changes which have retroactive elements (about 120 of the
2500). I follow RR in dealing with this issue. A tax change with a retroactive implementation date
has two components, the future eect on revenues going forward (the non-retroactive element)
and the outstanding liabilities for the period before the announcement. As in RR, the baseline
dataset simply excludes the retroactive elements and I assign the `full year' revenue estimate to
the announcement date.16 As a robustness check I derive a series which assigns the accumulated
retroactive liabilities as a levy to the same date, removing this the following quarter.
Finally, a few policy actions are not included. These include personal income tax credits (the
Treasury and the Institute for Fiscal Studies regard these as spending; they have to be claimed and
are closer to a denition of welfare transfers) and statutory or pre-expected indexation of duties,
allowances and thresholds (for example uprating of the personal allowance each year with ination
or simple ination increases in excise duties). Ination increases in certain taxes are recorded by the
Treasury as zero-revenue changes against the indexed base and also contain no new discretionary
policy information so are excluded.17 For more detail and justication again see Cloyne (2010).
16There are several reasons for this. Firstly, many changes are passed by Budget Resolution and are implemented
on Budget day anyway (see annex B). Secondly, few taxes are altered in debate and so this Budget announcement
is often presented as the implementation (unless of course a later date is given). When an implementation date is
in the past, the day the change becomes known seems the most appropriate `implementation' for the non-retroactive
element. See Cloyne (2010) for how this compares with RR.
17Romer and Romer do the same, arguing that these types of changes are basically an automatic uprating, con-
taining no new policy information.
122.3 Properties of the new tax dataset
This section considers some of the features of the new dataset. Figure (1) illustrates the `exogenous'
policy changes which will be used in the later analysis. The series has a mean of -0.06 per cent of
GDP, which is the same order of magnitude and sign as the RR series. There is also a fair amount
of variation in gure (1) and the standard deviation is 0.25. The large positive and negative spikes
in the middle of the series come from staggered timing in a move from direct to indirect taxes.18
As a robustness check I correct for this later.


















Figure 1: Exogenous tax changes
The full discretionary policy series (including exogenous and endogenous changes), shown in
gure (2), is more volatile, largely reecting the countercyclical actions (many of which were to deal
with ination). The mean is closer to zero at -0.014 but is more volatile with a standard deviation
of 0.48.
Figure (3) shows the dierent subcomponents of the exogenous category (except the external
category as these changes are small). The larger changes clearly arise from the long-run economic
actions. We can also see some key periods of supply-side reform. The most sizable attempts to
use tax policy for stimulating long-term economic performance were in the early 1950s (the Butler
supply-side reform and mid 1950's boom), the early 1970s (\less but better government"19 and the
18V.A.T was increased in 1979Q3, income tax allowances were cut for the whole year 1979-80 and so the imple-
mentation date is taken as the announcement, but the accompanying income tax rate changes were not implemented
until 1979Q4.
19Cairncross (1992), page 189.
13Heath-Barber boom), throughout the 1980s (the Thatcher/Howe/Lawson supply-side reforms) and
the 1996/97 Clarke income tax cuts.




















Figure 2: Exogenous policy changes and all policy changes























Figure 3: Long-run economic, ideological and decit consolidation exogenous policy changes
There were some sizable ideologically motivated policy changes, although not on the scale or
14frequency as the 1980s reforms aimed at long-run economic performance. There were also notable
decit consolidation measures throughout the 1990s following the recession.
It is also interesting to briey look at the components of the endogenous series. These are
illustrated in gure (4). There were few countercyclical tax policy actions (demand management
or supply stimuli) after 1980 until 2008. The height of demand management policy was therefore
between 1945 and 1979. This compares with a greater emphasis on the use of monetary policy for
stabilisation after 1979. Sizable decit reduction actions can also be seen, for example Georey
Howe's famously strict 1981 Budget. Measures to help fund increased expenditure on public services
in the early 2000s are also visible.

























Figure 4: Countercyclical, spending-driven, decit reduction endogenous policy changes
2.4 Testing the predictability of the `exogenous' tax changes
The `exogeneity' of the constructed tax series is the key identifying assumption. While we cannot
test whether our `exogenous' series is contemporaneously uncorrelated with other macroeconomic
data,20 it is still instructive to consider whether the new series is unforecastable on the basis of
past information.
Following Romer and Romer, I rst perform a simple Granger Causality test using output21
20Recall that the tax variable itself may simultaneously determine the independent variable, for example output.
21The series in this section are de-trended using the Baxter-King lter. However the results in table 1 are similar
for growth rates and linear de-trending. In both cases using the exogenous series generated high p-values, using the
countercyclical series generated low p-values.
15and the exogenous tax series. The results are presented in table 1.22 Table 1 shows that at all three
lag lengths it was not possible to reject the hypothesis that GDP does not Granger Cause the tax
series. The p-value was high, over 0.9, with 4, 8 and 12 lags. As a comparison, I check whether the
endogenous countercyclical series can be forecast on the basis of output. The null hypothesis was
clearly rejected with p-values well below 0.01 for all three lag lengths.
Table 1: Granger Causality and Ordered Probit Results
Series Test statistic P-value
Exogenous series
Granger Causality: 4 lags 0.24 0.91
Granger Causality: 8 lags 0.35 0.94
Granger Causality: 12 lags 0.42 0.95
Ordered Probit 10.06 0.61
Countercyclical series
Granger Causality: 4 lags 5 0.001
Granger Causality: 8 lags 3.2 0.002
Granger Causality: 12 lags 3.7 0.0001
Ordered Probit 27.50 0.007
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, I check whether the decision to act itself can be
forecast from past information. This method is suggested by Mertens and Ravn (2010). It requires
re-aggregating the tax series using the announcement date rather than the implementation date
and performing an Ordered Probit regression. The underlying latent process is the tax series itself,
call this t. Now dene a `policy action' indicator variable !t where:
!t =
8
> > > <
> > > :
 1 if t < 0
0 if t = 0
1 if t > 0
9
> > > =
> > > ;
The Ordered Probit model is then estimated as usual by Maximum Likelihood. As in Mertens
and Ravn (2010), the independent variables are taken to be (lags 1 to 4 of) output, consump-
tion and investment. This method addresses whether the decision itself is forecastable from past
macroeconomic data. Of course, this does not consider the size of the announcement but should
22A high p-value for the Granger Causality test implies that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that output does
not Granger Cause the tax shocks. A high p-value for the Ordered Probit implies we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that all the coecients on the various forecasting variables are zero.
16give a sense of whether the policy decision was a product of economic conditions. In this sense it
is a more meaningful test.
I test the null hypothesis that all the coecients in the regression are zero. For the exogenous
series, the p-value of the Likelihood ratio statistic was 0.61, implying that (at standard signicance
levels) we cannot reject the hypothesis that the variables in the regression contain no information
for forecasting the exogenous series. By contrast the p-value for the countercyclical series was 0.007,
clearly allowing us to reject the hypothesis that output, consumption and investment contain no
information on which to forecast the countercyclical endogenous tax series.
These two tests suggest that the exogenous series is unforecastable on the basis of past infor-
mation and add weight to our claim that the constructed tax series is indeed exogenous.
3 The macroeconomic eects of tax shocks: baseline specication
Having given weight to our claim that the newly constructed series is exogenous we are now ready
to make use of these data for analysis. As discussed in section 2, with an innite sample the
estimation of equation (4) should yield consistent estimates of the eects of an exogenous tax
shock. However, in truncating the number of lags and with the smaller samples in time series
analysis, it has become standard practice to use vector autoregressions, although I compare these
baseline results with equation (4) later.
The eects of a tax shock are estimated from the following vector autoregression (VAR):
Xt = A0 + A1t + B(L)Xt 1 + C(L)dt + "t (5)
where B and C are lag polynominals with P and (Q+1) lags respectively. The narrative shocks dt
are included as an exogenous variable following the preceding discussion. This specication follows
Mertens and Ravn (2010) and the inclusion of narrative shocks as an exogenous variable is in
keeping with the narrative approach to government spending shocks, for example in Burnside et al.
(2004). There is a trade-o between a long lag structure reecting equation (4) and protecting
degrees of freedom in a smaller sample. RR use 12 lags of dt (and the contemporaneous value)
and I follow this convention, in other words Q = 12. I take P = 4 which is common, although I
experiment both with longer and shorter lag structures for B(L) and the results are robust. Later I
also show that the results are robust to estimating the model with the X vector in rst dierences.
As mentioned earlier, quarterly National Accounts data are not available for the United King-
dom before 1955Q1. I therefore take the sample to be 1955Q1 to 2009Q4. The baseline specication
includes the log of real per capita GDP (yt), consumption (ct) and investment (it). Thus:
Xt = [yt ct it]
0 :
17Other variables of interest are then added as in Burnside et al. (2004) to preserve degrees of freedom.
The other variables of interest will be: imports, exports, government consumption, government total
managed expenditure, total revenues (all log of real per capita) as well as ination, the nominal
interest rate, real wages and hours worked per person. Precise description of the data is given in
annex A.
The gures below report the baseline results for output, consumption and investment for Q = 12,
P = 4, together with standard 68 per cent non-parametric, non-centred bootstrapped condence
intervals using 10,000 replications.23
3.1 Baseline results for output and its components
Figure (5)24 illustrates the central result of this paper. A one percentage point cut in taxes as a
percentage of GDP generates a large and persistent stimulus to output. A percentage point cut in
the tax variable causes a boost of 0.6 per cent (p = 0:02) in output on impact. This eect then
rises to nearly 2.5 per cent (p = 0:001) after about 3 years before receding.25
I now compare this result with the RR United States dataset. Figure (6) performs estimation of
equation (5) using the Romer{Romer data.26 The results in gures (5) and (6) are strikingly similar
and reect the actual ndings in Romer and Romer (2010) | where the empirical specication is
dierent | and Mertens and Ravn (2010) for an unanticipated tax cut. The close similarity with
the United States is quite remarkable; all the more so given the very dierent tax history, policy
framework and sources (and that the U.K. data are the result of aggregating nearly 2,500 classied
changes).
23The method was as follows: (i) randomly draw residuals from the tted residuals ^ "t and use (5) to simulate
an articial time series ^ Xt (ii) perform estimation of (5) using the simulated data (iii) construct impulse response
functions for this simulated dataset and save the output (iv) repeat 10,000 times to construct an empirical distribution
of impulse response functions (v) take the 16th and 84th percentile as the empirical condence intervals.
24The Matlab software written to perform all the estimation and generate the graphical outputs is available from
the author on request.
25As the gures are based on a simulation which sets dt =  1 in t = 1 and 0 for all other time periods, we could
equally have displayed a tax rise (d1 = 1) with a large and persistent negative output eect.
26Available from their website.

















Figure 5: Response of GDP to 1 per cent of GDP cut in taxes

















Figure 6: Response of GDP using Romer{Romer U.S. data
I consider the eect of the 1 percentage point tax cut on the other variables in the baseline
VAR. Figure (7) illustrates the eect on household consumption and investment. For consumption
the impact eect is larger at 1.3 per cent (p  0) and has a maximum impact of 2.9 per cent
(p = 0:004). This suggests that tax shocks have a slightly greater eect on household consumption
19than on GDP, although the shape and order of magnitude are very similar. It is also interesting
to note that the consumption response is smoother. The investment response is large and positive,
again remarkably similar to the results for the United States. The impact eect is 1.2 per cent
(p = 0:07) and rises to 4.5 per cent (p = 0:02).


































Figure 7: Response of consumption and investment to 1 per cent of GDP cut in taxes
Figure (8) illustrates the eect of the tax cut on imports and exports. One would expect a more
immediate eect on imports than exports: the tax cut directly reduces the demand for imports
by aecting domestic demand. The eect on exports may well be driven more | at least in the
20short run | by the state of foreign demand (although this obviously depends on what happens to
the real exchange rate). Figure (8) reects this intuition. Imports increase signicantly following
the tax cut while the export response is largely insignicant. It is interesting to note the similar
shape of the investment and the imports responses | suggesting that the volatility of investment
is driven by volatility of imported capital goods.






































Figure 8: Response of imports and exports to 1 per cent of GDP cut in taxes
In short, this section demonstrates a striking result. Tax cuts (increases) have large, positive
21(negative), signicant and persistent eects on key macroeconomic aggregates in the U.K.
3.2 The labour market response
I now consider the eect on labour market variables of a 1 percentage point cut in taxes. Unfortu-
nately, data for hours worked and the real wage are not available for U.K. over the whole period
1955{2009; I therefore use a restricted sample.
Hours worked are dened as average weekly hours worked per person and this series is only
available from 1971Q1. The real wage is dened as the (nominal) Average Earnings Index divided
by the GDP deator. This series is available from 1963Q1 onwards. I rst check that the GDP
response to the tax shock is similar when the sample is restricted to these time periods: the GDP
response is indeed very similar in shape, magnitude and persistence. I then add each of the labour
market variables to the VAR.
Figure (9) illustrates the eect of the tax cut on the real wage and on hours worked. The impact
eect on the real wage is sizable at 1.2 per cent and rising to 3.3 per cent after 11 quarters (both
with p-values approximately zero).
Hours worked, however, exhibit a smaller response. This can be seen in the bottom panel of
gure (9). The response is not statistically signicant for much of the period and the size of the
response is everywhere less than 1 per cent. This suggests that hours worked do not respond much
in response to a tax shock. These results are similar to Mertens and Ravn (2010) who nd, following
a surprise shock, that hours worked are less signicant and not as sizable as the other variables
(although their hours response peaks above 1 per cent, which is higher than my estimate).
The labour market results are interesting: so far the GDP, consumption and investment broadly
reect neoclassical predictions (at least qualitatively and including features such as investment
adjustment costs as in Christiano et al. (2005)). The hours response is qualitatively what one
would expect from a typical theoretical model (given the substitution eects from distortionary
taxes), although the real wage may well be too responsive. Further work is needed to explore how
well theory can t these facts.







































Figure 9: Response of the real wage and hours worked to 1 per cent of GDP cut in taxes
234 Robustness
4.1 Estimation of a rst dierences model
To guard against the possibility of spurious results deriving from unit roots in the output, con-
sumption and investment series,27 I also estimate a rst dierence version of the VAR with the
endogenous variables as the growth rates.28
On impact the contraction is very similar at 0.65 per cent (p = 0:02) and the greatest impact
is again at 11 quarters at 2.96 per cent (p = 0:005). The shape is very similar although the
VAR in growth rates produces a more persistent response (but this is sensitive to the lag length
Q). Certainly the short to medium term magnitudes and dynamics are very similar to the model
estimated using levels. However, the rst-dierences model is less precisely estimated with wider
standard errors, particularly at longer horizons. Given the focus on short to medium term eects
in this paper, I continue to use the levels specication for the baseline results.
4.2 Controlling for other shocks to revenues
Perotti (2010) argues that one needs to control for the possibility that changes in revenues have an
additional eect on output other than via changes in dt (for example, the eects of the automatic
stabilisers). In general | and illustrated below | Perotti's argument implies one needs to control
for other shocks to revenue to consistently estimate the eects of the exogenous taxes. Suppose
that (log of real) revenues (st) is described by the follow relationship:
st = yt + dt + s
t (6)
where s can be thought of as a shock to revenues and picking up inuences other than the cyclical
changes due to output growth or policy.29 Perotti argues that estimating a model such as (5) ignores
the eect of other changes in revenues. For consistent estimation we must implicitly maintain the
assumption that revenues (or in his setup, specically st   dt) do not aect the endogenous
variables other than via dt.
However, the problem is more general and applies even if we include revenues in equation (5).














27Augmented Dicky Fuller tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in these log real per capita series.
28This specication is used by Perotti (2010). However, it is very common to nd VARs estimated in levels,
especially in the scal shocks literature.
29Note that Perotti assumes  = 1 but this is an inappropriate restriction as the RR shocks are the nominal change








where equation (8) nests equation (6). We can always rewrite this model in the Perotti form with





























5 + (L)dt + t (9)
were (L) is a (Q + 1) lag polynomial.
Dening the left hand side coecient matrix as A, the coecient matrix on the lagged terms
 and Zt as the vector of endogenous variables, the reduced form of this model can be written as:
Zt = A 1Zt 1 + A 1(L)dt + A 1t (10)
















requiring n(n   1)=2 = 1 restriction on the A matrix to identify the structural shocks t. Given
that we are including contemporaneous dt it does not make sense to then restrict 
y
0 = 0 and
equation (6) implies that we should not restrict s
0 = 0 either. In short, there is a standard
identication problem unless we are willing to assume that the only way revenues aect output
contemporaneously is through shocks to dt (
y
0 = 0).
The consequences of this are twofold. First, and more obviously, excluding revenues from
the model may lead to inconsistent estimates. But secondly, even when we include revenues in
our VAR specication as an additional endogenous variable, we cannot consistently estimate the
coecients. To see this more clearly, substitute the revenues equation into the output equation. To




1 = 0, s
1 =  and s





















































and note that if 
y
0 6= 0 then shocks to s aect y contemporaneously. This implies that the
lagged s terms are correlated with the lagged y terms.
As can be seen from (13), the problem is that we need to control for potential other shocks
to revenue. However, we cannot simply include a tted residual s in (13): as shown above, s is
not identied without restrictions on the A matrix. Obviously one restriction that would work is
25
y
0 = 0 but this was ruled out above. Additionally we could impose the restriction  = 0, allowing
us to construct s from (11) and (12).30 But again this was ruled out.
Equation (13) illustrates the two problems mentioned above. If we exclude revenues and they
do exert an independent eect on output our estimates will be inconsistent. Furthermore, including
st does not solve the identication problem.31
Perotti pursues an instrumental variable approach which solves the identication problem with-
out requiring restrictions on the A matrix. We cannot directly estimate (6) as s is correlated with
yt. The solution is to use lagged values of yt as instruments and then estimate the parameters
 and . This allows us to construct a tted value of s which can be used in the regression (13).
As a robustness check I implement this method. Given the specication of equation (6), it is
more straightforward to directly use the model with the X vector in rst dierences:
Xt = ~ A0 + ~ A1t + ~ B(L)Xt 1 + ~ C(L)dt + ~ D(L)^ s
t + ut (14)
I rst estimate (6) with the lags 1 to 4 of yt and lags 0 to 4 of dt as instruments for yt
and construct ^ s. I then estimate equation (14) using ^ s and its lags.32 Having corrected for other
shocks to revenues the results are very similar. The eect on impact is 0.57 per cent (p = 0:026)
and the maximum eect is 2.2 per cent (p = 0:012). Interestingly, the estimate of  (the elasticity
of revenues to GDP) is 1.47, which is higher than the constructed elasticity of 0.76 in Perotti (2005)
and closer to his gure for the United States of 1.85.33
4.3 Controlling for other structural shocks
If the tax series is truly exogenous there should be no need to control for other structural shocks
such as monetary policy or government spending shocks. However, in a smaller sample, there may
be chance correlation and in this section I control for that possibility.34
4.3.1 Monetary policy shocks
To control for monetary policy shocks I include extra monetary variables in the VAR (5). X now
includes the ination rate and the Bank of England policy interest rate. The Bank of England
30Note that this discussion works the other way round if we had substituted the output equation into the revenues
equation.
31Of course, in the special case where all the  coecients are zero or where 
s
t = 0, 8t neither problem arises.
32As ^ 
s is a generated regressor the two step estimation procedure needs to be repeated when bootstrapping in
order to take account of the sampling distributions of  and .
33Perotti (2005) argues that the low elasticity for the U.K. might be due to some of the components being under-
estimated. He therefore augments the baseline value by 0.5. It is interesting that we estimate a higher value.
34Mertens and Ravn (2010) argue that one should control for both monetary and spending shocks. Romer and
Romer (2010) also control for spending shocks, concluding that their results are robust.
26policy rate is available from the Bank of England website, although this series contains all the
changes in the rate on a specic day. I therefore convert this into a quarterly series using the rate
prevailing at the end of the quarter. The ination rate is the annualised Retail Price Index | a
series which is available for the full sample (unlike the Consumer Price Index).
To avoid similar identication issues to those described in section 4.2 we need to impose some
identifying assumptions. The interest rate is allowed to be aected contemporaneously by all
the other endogenous variables and the tax shocks. Following Christiano et al. (1996), I employ
a Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of "t to identify appropriately the monetary
policy shock as an innovation to the Bank of England nominal policy rate.
The results of this exercise are presented in gure (10) which shows the eect on output,
consumption, investment, the Bank of England interest rate and ination. We can see that the
eect on output, consumption and investment is extremely close to the baseline case. The eect
on GDP on impact is 0.59 per cent (p = 0:02) and rises to 2.67 per cent (p = 0:0004) after about 3
years. It is also interesting to note the eect on the other variables. On impact the tax cut lowers
ination slightly, perhaps reecting that consumption taxes were often used in the U.K. However,
over time the eect on ination is signicantly positive | as one would expect given the overall
stimulus to the economy. The central bank's policy rate follows a similar path to ination, again
as would be expected from a simple interest rate rule; the policy instrument eventually becomes
positive as ination goes above target.
4.3.2 Fiscal policy shocks
While the tax shocks have been constructed as exogenous from the spending decisions it is still
instructive to control for spending shocks as a robustness check. First, there is always the possibility
that the categorisation is not perfect. Secondly, as mentioned above, it makes sense given the smaller
sample. X will now include log of real government spending on goods and services per capita.
Without a better way (for example a spending narrative dataset) to identify spending shocks,
I employ standard identifying assumptions on the timing of government spending shocks as in
Blanchard and Perotti (2002). I order spending rst in the VAR. A Cholesky decomposition of the
covariance matrix of the "t is therefore sucient to identify the government spending shock.
The results are shown in gure (11) and are again very similar. For example, output increases
0.62 per cent (p = 0:02) on impact and the largest eect is at 2.3 per cent (p = 0:002) after about 3
years. The Government spending response is statistically insignicant for the rst two years before
rising | a result consistent with Romer and Romer (2009).35
35I also control for government total managed expenditure net of debt interest payments (as in RR) rather than
















































































































































Figure 11: The eects of a tax cut after controlling for scal policy shocks
4.4 Excluding anticipated shocks
By assigning the liabilities change to the implementation date we are implicitly assuming that
agents react to the shock when implemented and not before. However, the implementation date
is sometimes later than the announcement date and we may be concerned that agents anticipate
the implementation. I therefore examine the possibility that the results are being inuenced by
anticipation eects.
Following Mertens and Ravn (2010), I dene a surprise shock as one which is implemented within
one quarter (90 days) of the announcement date. The sample is therefore split into discretionary
actions whose announcement and implementation dates are the same quarter and those which may
be anticipated. Figure 15 in annex B provides a histogram of the implementation lags, the time
29between announcement and implementation. We can see that the overwhelming majority of actions
are surprise actions, being implemented within one quarter of announcement (and many of these
are actually implemented on or around announcement). This suggests a straightforward check: I
simply exclude the potentially anticipated changes, that is I only use the surprise shocks.
The rst panel in gure (12) illustrates the eect of a surprise tax shock on output. The shape
of the response and magnitude are again broadly similar although the largest fall in output is
slightly deeper at over 3 per cent, still occurring between 10 and 12 quarters.
4.5 Comparison with the Romer and Romer method
Romer and Romer's baseline results come from the estimation of (4) directly. To repeat this here,
they estimate:
yt =  +
Q X
j=0
jdt j + t (15)
taking Q = 12.
The purpose of this subsection is to compare the results gained from this simpler approach to
the baseline VAR results above. The second panel in gure (12) reports the results from the single
equation (darker line, crosses and long dashes) and the single equation modied by lagged GDP
(lighter line, circles and short dashes). Firstly, these two are very close, with both point estimates
falling within the other's condence intervals. Secondly, the magnitudes and shapes are very similar
to the baseline VAR results: an impact multiplier between 0.5 and 1 per cent, rising to around 2.5
per cent after 10-12 quarters.
4.6 Using all discretionary policy changes
Having constructed the exogenous tax series, it is instructive to ask whether the results are actually
dierent when using the full discretionary policy decision series (endogenous and exogenous). The
third panel of gure (12) shows that the response using all discretionary policy changes is much
closer to zero. Interestingly, this magnitude is closer to the Blanchard{Perotti type estimates |
suggesting that the identied shocks from this approach are biased downwards. The split between
exogenous and endogenous does again appear to be an important and meaningful distinction in
identifying the eects of tax shocks.
4.7 Retroactive components and the alternative classication
Until now I have made use of the series which excludes retroactive components and which has not
used the `alternative classication' method I outlined in section 2. It is worth checking that the
results are robust to these assumptions.
30First I include the retroactive elements. As discussed in section 2, these are handled by assigning
a levy of the accumulated liabilities from the retroactive implementation date to the announcement
date. As a levy this is then withdrawn in the following quarter. The results are very similar to
gure (5). The impact multiplier is 0.5 (p = 0:07) and the maximum eect is 2.3 (p = 0:002). Given
the complications of adding retroactive components in this way, the purpose is really to check that
the broad result is not distorted, which it is not.
Secondly, I consider the impact of using the alternative classication for the tax changes. Recall
that this treats in the same way all changes within Budgets that had specic overall objectives.
This means that seemingly exogenous tax cuts in an otherwise endogenously deationary Budget
would be classied demand management. This robustness check is designed to ensure there is not
correlation between the seemingly exogenous changes and some of the endogenous ones within the
same Budget. Again the results are very similar to (5) in magnitude and dynamics.
4.8 Outliers
In section 2 it was noted that the timing of the income tax cuts in 1979Q4 (and income tax allowance
changes for the whole scal year), which were to be counteracted by the V.A.T. rise in 1979Q3, lead
to two large outliers in the exogenous series (which can be seen visually in the gures in section 2).
Obviously these changes may be important but we want to ensure that the timing properties do
not unduly drive the overall results in section 3. The income tax allowance increases were for the
whole year, which means there was a retroactive element dating back to 1979Q2. Given our way
of dealing with retroactive elements, the implementation date was therefore taken to be 1979Q3 |
the same date as the V.A.T. rise. For consistency, I bring the implementation date for income tax
cuts (due in October) forward one quarter from Q4 to Q3. Once these three changes are considered
together (the original intention in the Budget), the spikes in 1979 are removed. This seems a more
sensible way of dealing with the timing issue than simply excluding all three changes as outliers.
Again, we are checking that the overall magnitude and dynamics are not being distorted. The
magnitudes and dynamics are once again very similar to the baseline case, again rising to 2.3 per
cent (p = 0:003) after 11 quarters.
4.9 Making use of observations back to 1948
Although the narrative in Cloyne (2010) dates from the rst post-war Budget in 1945, the relevant
quarterly National Accounts data are only available from 1955. However, as our tax shock series
goes back to 1948 (and 1945 in revenue changes), it is desirable to use all the data. Before 1955 the
U.K. did publish the Index of Production which, in the contemporary editions of Economic Trends,
was presented as an aggregate production measure. To make use of the dataset from 1948Q1, I
31run the single equation model (15) using the quarterly Index of Production growth rather than
quarterly real GDP growth as the dependent variable.
As can be seen in the fourth panel of gure (12), although the magnitudes are slightly greater,
the thrust of the main result remains | a sizable impact multiplier increasing to several per cent
after 10-12 quarters.






































































Figure 12: Robustness checks: (1) only considering surprise shocks, (2) comparison with RR single
equation baseline, (3) using all discretionary policy changes, and (4) using data back to 1948
5 Eects of dierently motivated shocks
Given that I have subcategories for the exogenous group of tax measures, I am able to ask other
interesting questions:
 Do shocks specically aimed at improving economic performance have more eect than ide-
ologically motivated changes?
32 What are the eects of a tax shock aimed at decit consolidation?
To answer these questions I replace the dt series with a subset: either long-run, ideological
or decit consolidation.36 For ease of economic interpretation, I continue to consider tax cuts for
long-run economic and ideological reasons but consider a tax increase for decit consolidation.
The rst panel of gure (13) illustrates the eect of a tax cut based on considerations of long-run
economic performance (crosses). The shape of the response is very close to the baseline estimates.
This conrms the view that long-run economic tax cuts do indeed stimulate GDP. The gure also
illustrates the eect of a tax cut based on ideological considerations (diamonds). An example of
this type of tax cut is an increase in the personal allowance designed to help the poorest. While
the eect is larger, the rst panel of gure (13) shows that the overall shape and magnitudes are
broadly consistent with the aggregate baseline series.
The lower panel of gure (13) illustrates the eect of a tax rise for decit consolidation. The
point estimate is interesting as it diers from the shape of the other responses. Initially there is
a large contractionary eect, bottoming out around 7 quarters. From then on the eect becomes
increasingly positive until, by year four, the tax increase has a positive eect on GDP. One might
postulate that this is in keeping with common views about decit consolidations | the contraction
in demand in the short run may cause a slowdown but, in the long-run, establishing sound public
nances has a positive eect on GDP over the medium term (although it does tend back to zero
eventually).
However, we must be cautious not to over-interpret these results: much of the response is
insignicant. As can be seen in section 2, the decit consolidation series has far fewer observations
than the other series | mostly occurring after 1980. The fewer observations may also explain the
imprecision of the estimates.
Finally, it is worth briey mentioning how excluding the decit consolidation measures af-
fects the results. Section 2 explained one might be concerned that all decit actions are actually
endogenous. As a check, I estimate the baseline VAR using the standard shock less the decit
consolidation measures. The result looks almost identical to the baseline case with an impact eect
of 0.6 (p = 0:02), peaking at 2.66 (p = 0:001) after 11 quarters.
36As a robustness check I include the full dt series less the subset in question as the rst endogenous variable in
the VAR. This allows for contemporaneous changes in the overall exogenous tax series from changes in a specic
subcomponent. The results are largely unaected.






































Figure 13: Eect on GDP of long-run and ideologically motivated tax cuts (baseline in grey),
together with the eect of a tax rise for decit consolidation
346 Tax shocks and the U.K. business cycle
Finally, having established the response of key variables to tax shocks, I now consider the eect of
these shocks on the U.K. business cycle. King and Rebelo (1999) argue that \changes in labour
and capital income taxes have eects that are similar to productivity shocks. However, these
taxes change infrequently making them poor candidates for sources of business cycles uctuations".
However, as I have discussed, in the United Kingdom taxes were changed frequently. Furthermore,
it has been argued that tax shocks do play an important role in the United States business cycle.
This is one of the conclusions of McGrattan (1994) and shown more recently by Mertens and Ravn
(2010).
In this section I simulate the estimated model from section 3 using the point estimates, the
identied tax shocks and assuming all other shocks are zero (that is the tted residuals ^ "t = 0,
8t). To control for other policy variables as in section 4 the X vector will include (in this order)
government spending, output, consumption investment (all log of real per capita), the rate of
ination and the central bank policy interest rate. The resulting simulated data series is then HP-
Filtered with the standard smoothing parameter of 1600 and compared against the actual (again
HP-Filtered) series. This comparison is shown in gure (14).
Dow (2000) identies three major recessions between 1945 and 1995: 1973{75, 1979{82 (al-
though unemployment continued rising until 1986) and 1989{1993. He also identies two major
`fast growth' periods: 1972{73 (often referred to as the Heath{Barber boom) and 1985{88 (the
Lawson boom). To these episodes of interest we might also add the volatility in the 1960s leading
to the 1967 devaluation and very tight Budgets of the late 1960s; the turbulent years in the run up
to the 1979 General Election; the late 1990s boom; the early 2000s world slowdown and the recent
overheating and crash. All of these episodes can, to some degree, be seen in the actual series.
To what extent did our tax policy shocks contribute to the U.K. business cycle? In the narrative,
four clear episodes of supply-side reform can be identied: the 1950s, the early 1970s, the 1980s
and the mid-1990s. These can be seen in the gures from section 2.
In the 1950s, while still embracing demand management, successive Conservative Chancellors
attempted to liberalise the economy. Taking the post 1955 period, in 1957 and 1958 Chancellor Pe-
ter Thorneycroft remitted considerable sums in taxation to achieve his goals of: \greater industrial
eciency and competitiveness", \the provision of better incentives and opportunities for initiative
and eort" and \the easing of the pressure of the tax system where this bears most hardly on
individuals and families".37 Examining the counterfactual simulation in gure (14) it appears that
these cuts played a major role in stimulating growth in the early 1960s.
There were also considerable tax cuts and reforms from 1970 to 1973 by Chancellor Anthony
37Hansard, HC Deb 09 April 1957 vol 568 c988
35Barber | hence the term the `Heath{Barber boom' (Edward Heath was Prime Minister). Actual
annual GDP growth rose from around 2 per cent in 1970/71 to 3.7 per cent in 1972 and 7.2 per cent
in 1973. The 1972 Budget in particular made wide-ranging reforms to the tax system, including
changes to Corporation Tax and the introduction of V.A.T. Woodward (2004) argued that the
Government \did not only engineer a major boom, but the stimulus was applied over a relatively
short period".38 All three panels in gure (14) imply that tax policy contributed to the boom.
As the economy recovered from the early 1980s recession Chancellor Nigel Lawson also carried
out major supply-side reform and sizable cuts in taxes. In 1983 there were major cuts to income
taxes, in 1984 there were wide-ranging reforms to income, capital and business taxation. These
changes over predict growth in the mid 1980s. There was a pause in the magnitude of cuts in
the mid-1980s Budgets, resuming in 1987 and 1988. Many commentators came to believe these
giveaways overstimulated an overheating economy by the end of the decade. The delayed eects of
these show up as contributing to the end of the Lawson boom in gure (14). It is worth noting that,
while Dow dates the end of the boom as 1989, GDP did not start falling until the third quarter of
1990.
Following the 1990{91 recession, by the middle of the decade Chancellor Kenneth Clarke was
able to cut income taxes again. This is the fourth major episode of supply-side reform. Still aiming
at a 20 pence basic rate of income tax, the major cuts came in the 1995 and 1996 Budget, where the
Chancellor argued \low direct taxes are the most eective way to encourage enterprise and hard
work".39 From gure (14) these appear to have fuelled what the incoming Labour Government of
1997 saw as overheating.40
In short, these exogenous tax shocks do appear to have played an important role in key episodes
in the U.K. business cycle.
38Woodward (2004), page 141.
39Hansard, HC Deb 26 November 1996 vol 286 c170.
40Hansard, HC Deb 25 November 1997 vol 301 c773.


























Figure 14: Simulated output, consumption and investment based on tax shocks vs actual
377 Conclusion
This paper has shown powerful, persistent, positive and signicant eects of a tax cut on GDP, con-
sumption, investment, hours worked, the real wage and imports in the United Kingdom. Ination
and the policy interest rate also become positive, as one would have expected. Output increases
by around 0.6 per cent on impact, rising to 2.5 per cent over 3 years. This implies that tax cuts
stimulate above trend growth for over three years.
There are two important implications of the results in this paper. Firstly, that `exogenous'
tax cuts (increases) have important stimulus (contractionary) eects on the U.K. economy and
have played a role in key episodes in the U.K. business cycle. Furthermore these ndings are more
robust than existing U.K. results. Secondly, in providing new narrative-based estimates I contribute
directly to the international evidence. The Romer{Romer results for the U.S. have attracted much
attention, in part because the eect is so large. It is quite remarkable that my U.K. results are
so similar to those for the United States. This commonality is not found in the SVAR literature
and this striking congruence reinforces the Romer{Romer ndings. The similarity is all the more
important given how the data were constructed. The two datasets (U.K. and U.S.) are not, for
example, based on standardised National Accounts revenue series; they are derived from Budget
processes, histories and administrative sources, which are all quite dierent.
The results were shown to be robust to a variety of dierent checks and specications, the eect
on impact was similar to the baseline and the response increased to around 2.5 per cent after about
three years. The other variables were similarly aected. I am therefore condent of the robustness
of the overall magnitudes and dynamics.
The identication of tax shocks is extremely challenging | possibly explaining why uncovering
their eect has proven so controversial. Identication is achieved by constructing a new narrative
dataset for the U.K. and employing the Romer and Romer (2010) approach. The dataset contains
nearly 2,500 tax changes. These were all carefully classied by motivation to separate the decisions
correlated with current and prospective economic shocks from those that could be regarded as
exogenous. Full details can be found in the companion paper, Cloyne (2010). I hope this will
provide a useful new resource for further research as well as an interesting contribution to U.K.
post-war economic tax history.
In short, this paper nds robust evidence that tax changes had important macroeconomic eects
in the United Kingdom and contributed to the post-war business cycle. Results for the U.K. are
much scarcer (and more anomalous) than for the U.S. and this paper lls that gap. That the results
are so similar to the Romer{Romer ndings is remarkable and lends strong weight to the argument
that tax cuts do indeed have large, positive and persistent eects on the macroeconomy. Finally,
the unique new U.K. dataset provides a fascinating resource for further research.
38Appendices
A Data appendix
Specic data denitions can be found in table 2. Per capita variables are the real chained volume
measures, seasonally adjusted, divided by population. Log variables are multiplied by 100 so that
the log change in a variable is a growth rate expressed in per cent (the tax variable is a percentage).
Revenues are the only variable not cyclically adjusted at source. It is therefore cyclically
adjusted using the X-12 ARIMA software from the United States Census Bureau.
































Days (grouped into quarters) between implementation 
Figure 15: Distribution of implementation lags, grouped by quarters (90 days)
39Table 2: Data sources
Series Source Description Series
Output ONS GDP ABMI
Consumption ONS Final household consumption
expenditure
ABJR
Investment ONS Gross Fixed Capital Forma-
tion
NPQT
Imports ONS Trade in Goods and Services:
Total Imports
IKBL
Exports ONS Trade in Goods and Services:
Total Exports
IKBK
Real Wage ONS Average Earnings Index di-
vided by GDP deator
LNMQ/YBGB
Hours ONS Weekly hours worked per
worker
YBUS/MGRZ
Ination ONS Change in Retail Price Index CZBH
Index of Produc-
tion
ONS Covers manufacturing, min-
ing and quarrying and energy
supply
CKYW
Interest rate Bank of
England
Bank Rate/ Minimum Lend-








ONS Nominal total managed ex-
penditure minus debt interest
divided by GDP deator
(EBFT-
NMFX)/YBGB
Revenues ONS Total receipts divided by
GDP deator
ANBV/YBGB
GDP deator ONS Implicit price deator for
GDP
YBGB
Nominal GDP ONS GDP in current prices YBHA
40C  Extracts from the narrative
1  
1. Budget 19
th March 1968 
Chancellor: Roy Jenkins; Prime Minister: Harold Wilson (Labour) 
 
Context 
The economy grew strongly through the first half of 1967. However, as the year progressed GDP growth 
was slowing down.
2 Export growth, by contrast, had either been low or negative through 1967. In May 
the Government announced Britain’s intention to join the EEC. Suspicion arose that joining may be 
accompanied by devaluation. The Six Day War in the Middle East, an oil embargo and the closure of the 
Suez Canal occurred in June. Interest rate relaxations were also reducing the incentive to hold sterling. By 
the end of the year the balance of payments was showing a significant deficit. Cairncross (1992) notes 
that at some stage in 1960, almost regardless of government policy, devaluation was perhaps inevitable, 
the UK’s competitive power had simply failed to keep up in the post-war period.
3 Devaluation occurred 
on 18
th November 1967 and Callaghan [the previous Chancellor] resigned on the 29
th. A deflationary 
package of measures accompanied the devaluation (dealt with below). In January the new Chancellor Roy 
Jenkins announced large expenditure cuts of £500 million (1.1 per cent of GDP) in 1968-9 – reversing the 
trend of growth in public expenditure.
4 Still, in the first quarter of 1968 real household consumption was 
7 per cent higher than it had been in the first quarter of 1967.
5 Speculative pressure on sterling was to 
continue all the way to March 1968. 
 
Overall Budget Objectives and Motivation 
The Chancellor set straight to work in the Budget speech: “this Budget is concerned with the structural 
changes  in  the  pattern  of  economic  demand  and  activity  that  are  required  to  enable  us  to  take  full 
advantage of devaluation and establish a substantial and continuing balance of payments surplus… These 
measures are in themselves severe”.
6 On the external position the Chancellor was frank “we are still in a 
position  of  great  difficulty”,  although  mediated  by  “but  also  of  great  opportunity”.
7  In  his  budget 
judgement, Jenkins explained “we must check the growth of public expenditure and private consumption, 
which were the main expansionary forces last year, and release the resources necessary to sustain as large 
an increase in exports and industrial investment as possible”.
8 Succinctly, “the vital thing this year and 
next is to put the balance of payments into substantial surplus. This can only be done by sacrificing the 
normal claims of home demand on our resources.”
9 Jenkins decided he needed to raise a “very large sum 
of additional taxation”.
10 In total this amounted to £923 million (2.1 per cent of GDP) in a full year and 
was in addition to significant cuts in expenditure and a tough incomes policy. Blackaby (1978) described 
this as “perhaps the most formidable deflationary budget since the war”. All but two of the tax measures 




First I deal with the deflationary measures which accompanied the devaluation on the 18
th November 
1967. These were an increase in the Bank Rate, a limit on bank advances, increase in hire purchase 
deposits on cars, an increase in Corporation Tax to 42.5 per cent (although this justified in the 1968 
Budget  speech  and  FSBR),  abolition  of  the  export  rebate  and  withdrawal  of  some  of  the  Selective 
Employment  Tax  (S.E.T.)  rebates.  As these  measures  accompany  the  devaluation  I  classify  them  as 
                                                       
1 Part of the longer companion paper, Cloyne (2010), available at http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctpjsc/ 
2 ONS (2010) 
3 Cairncross (1992), p.164. 
4 Ibid. 
5 ONS (2010) 
6 HC Deb 19 March 1968 vol 761 c253 
7 HC Deb 19 March 1968 vol 761 c258 
8 HC Deb 19 March 1968 vol 761 c259 
9 HC Deb 19 March 1968 vol 761 c261 
10 HC Deb 19 March 1968 vol 761 c273 
41endogenous, demand management. The removal of the export rebate and the changes to the S.E.T. appear 
in the data series. 
 
1968 Budget Tax Measures 
All the tax rises follow the Chancellor’s statement about the need to raise a considerable sum of money. 
Income tax allowances were reduced from 6
th April 1968. From 6
th April 1969, a child’s investment 
income  was  to  be  considered  together  with  the  parent(s).    There  were  very  heavy  increases  in 
consumption taxes having concluded “that I ought to look for obtaining the bulk of my additional revenue 
from indirect taxation, but that it should be levied in as selective and non-regressive a way as possible”.
11 
Purchase Tax went up from 20
th March 1968; duties on spirits and wine also went up on the same day. 
Hydrocarbon duties rose from 19
th March 1968. Betting and gaming duties rose from 25
th March 1968 
and motor vehicle duties from 20
th March 1968. In all, these duty increases raised £440 million in a full 
year (1 per cent of GDP). 
On the business tax front, as announced in November 1967, Corporation Tax rose to 42.5 per cent 
– raising nearly £100 million. This was applied retrospectively, as was typical, from 1
st April 1967. There 
was  also  a  significant  rise  in  the  Selective  Employment  Tax  on  2
nd  September  1968,  although 
accompanying rebates also rose leaving the net revenue increase at just over £150 million in a full year. 
A significant amount of revenue was raised from the one year ‘special charge’: “it is right, in the 
context of this uniquely rigorous Budget, to propose a special charge to be calculated and expressed as a 
charge upon investment income”.
12 This was implemented on 6
th April 1967 retrospectively and for one 
year only, raising £100 million (0.2 per cent of GDP). But there were also a number of other capital and 
capital income tax measures, together raising £13 million in a full year and implemented on a variety of 
dates. 
Based on the overall objectives of the Budget I classify all these tax increases as endogenous, 
demand management. 
There were two concessions. On income tax the age exemption limit was increased “I believe that 
when what I hope will be a relatively short-term stringency has to be applied the elderly are entitled to 
some special consideration”.
13 Second, having ruled out an increase in Capital Gains Tax, the Chancellor 
announced  “certain  limited  changes  in  the  incidence  of  the  tax  which  I  propose.  In  making  these 
proposals I have particularly in mind the need to simplify the tax wherever possible”.
14 On face value 
these final two measures I classify as exogenous – the first as ideological, the second as long run. These 
remissions were very small compared with the increases. However, to ensure that these were not sums 




th March 1985 
Chancellor: Nigel Lawson; Prime Minister: Margaret Thatcher (Conservative) 
 
Context 
The Chancellor faced a familiar environment in 1985: 1984 had been another year of decent growth at 2.7 
per cent. This was 1 percentage point slower than the previous year but may well have been affected by 
the  miners’  strikes.  Inflation  was  edging  up,  but  still  comparatively  low  at  5  per  cent  in  1984. 
Unemployment was again around 100,000 higher than the previous March. Britton (1991) noted that the 
PSBR presented a problem but was disguised by increased revenue from various privatisations - a key 
ideological objective of the Government.
15 
 
Overall Objectives and Motivation 
From the outset unemployment was acknowledged as a problem: “my Budget today has two themes: to 
continue the drive against inflation and to help create the conditions for more jobs”.
16 However, a demand 
                                                       
11 HC Deb 19 March 1968 vol 761 c277 
12 HC Deb 19 March 1968 vol 761 c299 
13 HC Deb 19 March 1968 vol 761 c295 
14 HC Deb 19 March 1968 vol 761 c298 
15 Britton (1991), page 71. 
16 HC Deb 19 March 1985 vol 75 c783 
42stimulus was not the answer. The Government published an employment White Paper in March as well – 
unemployment  was  viewed  as  a  microeconomic  problem:  “boosting  demand  without  the  necessary 
improvements to the performance of the economy would only generate higher inflation”.
17 In short, “The 
Government's economic strategy has two key components: a monetary policy designed to bring down 
inflation and a supply-side policy designed to improve the competitive performance of the economy”.
18 
The higher PSBR was justified by the cost of the coal strike but this year Lawson planned to keep to his 
previous plans; there were to be no giveaways “for the coming year, a substantial reduction in the PSBR 
must take precedence over our objectives for reducing the burden of tax”.
19 However, the Chancellor 
argued “this Budget carries forward the theme of tax reform I set out last year… reform designed to 
improve our economic performance over the longer term, on which the jobs of the future will depend”
20 
and almost all the tax changes were, in the end, exogenous long run changes. 
 
Major Budget Tax Measures 
The  Chancellor  continued  the  switch  from  personal  income  tax  to  indirect  consumption  taxes:  “My 
Budget last year shifted some of the burden of personal taxation from earnings to spending. Today I 
propose to make a further move in this direction”.
21 As a consequence, the Chancellor sought the revenue 
required from excise duties. Alcohol, fuel, tobacco and vehicle excise duties all rose on the 19th March 
1985.  In  choosing  which  taxes  to  cut,  the  Chancellor  argued  “this  year,  a  Budget  for  jobs  and  for 
enterprise  has  to  give  high  priority  to  raising  the  tax  thresholds”.
22  The  main,  additional  and  age 
allowances all increased by more than indexation. There were indexation increases in the basic rate limit 
and the further higher rate thresholds. All these changes took place from 6
th March 1985. Based on the 
comments here, those above and those from the previous year I classify this package of measures as 
exogenous, long run. 
There were also a number of changes to VAT which, the Chancellor explained, (combined with 
the excise duty increases) “will help me to lighten the burden of income tax”.
23 VAT was extended to 
magazines and newspapers from 1
st May 1985; changes to VAT on credit cards and similar payment cards 
also raised revenue from 1
st May 1985; and “I propose to include in this year's Finance Bill legislation to 
implement most of the recommendations of the first two volumes of the Keith report on the enforcement 
powers of the revenue departments, including measures to deal with the problem of the late payment of 
VAT”.
24 I classify these changes together with the excise duties as exogenous, long run. 
There were also reforms to capital gains tax. The Chancellor explained “I have a number of other 
important proposals for tax reform to announce today, which will both simplify the system and encourage 
enterprise”.
25  These took the form of changes to indexation relief from 6
th March 1985.  In terms of 
revenue  there  were  more  minor  remissions;  however,  they  followed  a  change,  announced  on  28
th 
February 1985, that prevented the converting of income into less heavily taxed capital gains. As reforms 
to capital gains tax, I classify these changes as exogenous, long run. 
Finally the Chancellor announced significant cuts and reform of National Insurance:  “I want to 
do more to improve job prospects for young people and the unskilled, among whom the problem of 
unemployment is most severe…I have concluded that an effective response to this problem must include 
direct action in two related areas — to cut the costs of employing the young and unskilled, and to sharpen 
their own incentive to work at wages which employers can afford to pay… They tackle the problem of 
unemployment  where  it  is  most  acute”.
26  I  classify  this  measure  as  endogenous  (related  to  current 
unemployment levels), supply stimulus. 
These changes account for 95 per cent of the increases and nearly 90 per cent of the remissions. 
                                                       
17 Britton (1991), page 73. A point reiterated in the 1985 Budget speech (c785) 
18 HC Deb 19 March 1985 vol 75 c784 
19 HC Deb 19 March 1985 vol 75 c786 
20 HC Deb 19 March 1985 vol 75 c790 
21 HC Deb 19 March 1985 vol 75 c795 
22 HC Deb 19 March 1985 vol 75 c797 
23 Ibid. 
24 HC Deb 19 March 1985 vol 75 c798 
25 HC Deb 19 March 1985 vol 75 c791 
26 HC Deb 19 March 1985 vol 75 cc798-800 
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